Civil society organizations and the transition to democracy in Palestine by Kassis, Mudar
P1: FEA/GFQ/GIR/GGN P2: LMD/GCR
Voluntas [voluntas] PP110-299859 April 4, 2001 12:47 Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2001
Civil Society Organizations and Transition
to Democracy in Palestine1
Mudar Kassis2;3;4
This paper examines, through three surveys and some interview data, the dynamics
of contemporary Palestinian civil society organizations (CSOs) from the angle of
their role in the process of democratization. The paper analyses the emergence,
nature, and structures of CSOs in Palestine, and emphasizes the role of the public
in democratization. In particular it assesses both the positive and negative facets
of CSOs’ work from the perspective of their possible role in democratization. It
is concluded that CSOs play a positive but limited role in the democratization of
Palestinian society.
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Research on Arab civil society organizations (CSOs) became vital in view of
the transitions that many Arab countries are undergoing toward democratization
(Harik, 1996, p. 276) and that CSOs play a role in the processes of bringing about
and fostering these transitions (Gilbraith, 1996). The case of Palestinian CSOs is of
special importance, given the relatively advanced scope of these CSOs’ work and
the relatively high amount of international funding they are receiving under the as-
sumption that the liberalizational role they are expected to play is vital for the peace
process (Carapico, 2000, pp. 12, 13), for affecting the political system of the emerg-
ing Palestinian State, and thus, creating a durable peace (Ibrahim, 1993, p. 305).
In examining the role of Palestinian civil society in democratization, this re-
search adopts the opinion that it plays the role of a catalyst in democratization. As
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the process of democratization is connected to the nature of the political regime,
democratization cannot be achieved by the mere intervention of civil society alone
but requires effective political forces—the most prominent of which are the polit-
ical party and the public.
Palestinians (of the Palestinian territories) live under a combination of oc-
cupation and a new national authority, which has not been granted sovereignty.
The population of this territory—that is defined as the West Bank (including East
Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip (WBG)—is about 2.9 million (according to the
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics). The territories are geographically sepa-
rate and constitute a dependant economy (in relation to Israel). The GNP per capita
in WBG is $1,650 with a high poverty rate due to high price levels. WBG is placed
in the “low income” group together with countries such as Ghana, Nicaragua, or
Vietnam (West Bank and Gaza Update, April 2000, pp. 3–4).
In the Arab World in general, CSOs emerged initially either as charitable
organizations or family associations and service organizations (Bibi, 1995, p. 26).
Their nature, however, has undergone transformation because of the need to fight
colonialism, the emergence of national movements, and the birth of the new Arab
states (Ibrahim, 1997, p. 16). This fact should be underlined in the Palestinian case,
where CSOs faced the challenges of development under the extreme conditions
imposed by occupation.
In general, CSOs include most nongovernmental organizations that tend to
represent the interests of certain groups of the population and do not seek executive
power; therefore this definition excludes political parties (Al-Qaray, 1996, p. 52).
And in the Palestinian context it is also taken to exclude any organizations that are
not based on the voluntary participation of their members, like organizations of a
religious or family nature—organizations that Al-Jabiri refers to as “natural” orga-
nizations (1994, pp. 116, 117), or Al-Azm refers to as “traditional” organizations
(1997, p. 46). This definition is dictated by the nature of Palestinian society that
is a traditional rural society with predominant paternalist values (Muslih, 1993,
pp. 259, 260), where both clan and religion play a central role in the social structure
and social dynamics.
“Democratization” is easier to define, it is a process of gradual change in the
political system with the inclination to increasing the role of individuals and groups
in the decision-making process through representation and empowerment. The
process of democratization is often linked to the decentralization of the state, the
granting of liberties, and the adoption of a pluralistic political system; empowering
civil institutions to carry out tasks that were traditionally placed upon the shoulders
of the state; and, widening and deepening the process of individual and group
participation in decision-making.
Changes that take place in the structure of a social system toward deepening its
civility are invariably reflected in the political system, and support democratization
and vice versa. And the more that civil society is institutionalized, the greater
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its ability to have an effect upon the political system and curb the hegemony
of political authority. The extent to which civil society is institutionalized is a
central factor in expressing its potential to participate in democratization processes.
Institutionalization renders the role of institutions of civil society more effective,
and renders attack upon them far more difficult.
The process of institutionalization requires effort, time, and money, which
makes it a very slow process that is vulnerable to turbulence within the political
system. Therefore, the relationship between the institutionalization of the state and
that of civil society does not always lead to immediate changes in the structure of
society in compliance with those in the political system.
A number of factors affect the role of CSOs in advancing democratization.
In the Palestinian case there are several considerations that are of paramount im-
portance in offering obstacles to this process, namely: the impact of the Israeli
occupation and the nature of Israeli politics; the Palestinian National Authority
(PNA) and its limited advances in building democratic political life; the fact that
the Islamic opposition in the Palestinian arena does not consider democracy as one
of its priorities; the obliteration of leftist Palestinian organizations; the deteriorat-
ing economic situation; and, the patriarchal nature of eastern society, whereby the
individual is not seen as the main societal unit.
In examining the role of Palestinian CSOs in the process of transition to
democracy there is a need to discuss the relation between CSOs and the public.
For, the effectiveness of CSOs’ role in democratization is linked to the scope
of their activity concerning the promotion of civic values and allowing people
to participate in national issues in addition to providing a platform for public
debate. Here, however, there are a number of serious constraints on the exercise
of voluntary action, due to facts such as resistance to the occupation, the nature of
the PNA and its role, the specific conditions related to the interim period, and the
building of a political system. These factors have worked to undermine the social
base of CSOs and, hence, their potential role in promoting democratization. Add
to this the lack of independence which comes as a result of foreign funding (Said,
1999) and the degeneration of the subjective incentive for voluntary work. In view
of this the prospects do not seem bright.
SURVEYING PALESTINIAN CSOs
To consider these issues in greater depth I turn to consider three surveys
conducted by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies and some personal
interview material. The first survey—Survey I, which was conducted in November
1997—comprised a sample of 1,324 adults (above 18 years of age) from WBG.
This survey used multistage cluster sampling, with probability proportional to
population size in location (this method results in an, average for all questions,
error margin of §3%).
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Survey II and Survey III were conducted in the form of a set of additional
questions (an annex) in a questionnaire that was initially designed for the purpose
of evaluating CSOs’ work on policies and legislations in Palestine. Survey II was
conducted in December 1997 and Survey III in July 1998. Both Survey II and
Survey III were conducted on an identical sample of 291 CSOs that were chosen
according to the simple random sample method through a framework for sam-
pling prepared by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies, which included
1,200 organizations (the rate of possible error in this survey is §5%). Organiza-
tions surveyed included trade unions, clubs, associations, nonprofit development
organizations, and research centers. Universities and mass media were dealt with
through personal interviews.
From their outset, in the 1920s, Palestinian CSOs had the form of charitable
organizations, which were mainly interested in medical relief, assisting the poor,
and providing religious education. Since the Israeli occupation of WBG in 1967,
the nature of these organizations’ work has changed toward positive participation
and expansion of the nature and scope of membership. They have directed their
activity toward cooperative work of a civic nature and away from charitable work.
Thus, provision of financial relief does not constitute the most important part
of these institutions’ work in general. One example is that traditional women’s
organizations changed the aid criteria from “needy families” to “families of martyrs
or political prisoners” in a gesture of political involvement. Fighting the occupation
was the common denominator for all organizations. This constituted, in most cases,
a condition for Arab and local funding (including funding from the PLO) which
predominated before the Intifada (Giacaman, 1998).
According to Survey II, and validated in Survey III, the greater part of these
organizations were established during the occupation: 76% were established after
the 1967 occupation. The period of the Intifada, 1987–1993, witnessed the greatest
growth in the establishment of nongovernmental organizations—as 30% of these
organizations were established then. The rate of establishment of CSOs per year
reached 11.8 between 1988 and 1993, in comparison with 2.5 organizations a year
during the period 1923–1987, and 9.3 organizations in the period 1994–1996.
The nature of these organizations’ work is generally “traditional,” and almost
half of these are cultural or sports clubs; women’s organizations constitute 11%;
and human rights organizations, which are very active within the political field,
constitute 7%. They express the objective need to defend human rights, which have
been widely violated by the Israeli Authority. It does not seem that the Palestinians
are in any less need of these organizations after the establishment of the National
Authority as the occupation has persisted and because the National Authority does
not cater to these rights either. Developmental institutions form 5% of the total
number of institutions. The underdevelopment resulting from the occupation’s
practices was the major incentive for their establishment. As for the trade unions,
they represent 2.7%. The institutions concerned with child-care, research, care of
the disabled, care of the elderly and other institutions make up the rest.
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Fig. 1. Regional distribution of CSOs in relation to population distribution.
CSOs are concentrated in the central region of the West Bank, as it is con-
sidered the most “liberal” area; 79% of CSOs are located within the West Bank,
whereas 21% are in Gaza. Figure 1 reveals the regional distribution of CSOs in
comparison to distribution of population.
It is important to mention that there is a great deal of intertwining between
the Palestinian CSOs and other societal institutions as a result of the emergence
of a number of CSOs from the political factions. These factions also controlled
all the unions in the 80s, in addition to the cooperative societies. The factions also
had strong effect on the universities and other educational institutions which are
now in decline. As for their role in the media, the Palestinian Authority has taken
their place and the newspapers and magazines of the opposition are few and so
narrowly distributed that one cannot speak of their role (major newspapers have a
distribution of under 50,000 copies).
The relation between civil society and the Authority is a competitive one
in general, especially because the more important role that institutions of civil
society can play within the transition to democracy lies in its capacity to limit
the state’s hegemony. However, the fact that the institutions of civil society were
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established before the National Authority and the transformation of one of the
largest institutions, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—which could
have previously been categorized as a CSO5—into the Authority, has resulted in a
state of vicious competition between the two sides. [It should be noted that some
CSOs have been established by the Authority itself (Carapico, 2000)]. In light of
the continuing occupation, however, it is difficult for either of the two parties to
carry their divisions too far.
CSOs have played a compensatory role, which imposed itself in a practical
sense in place of the occupation authorities. This is partially the cause behind the
establishment and widening of the work of CSOs during the Intifada. Naturally the
resultant need for an alternative to the authority of the occupier was provided by
the coalition of CSOs, in which the PLO played a major role. This situation created
“competition between allies.” When asked, in Survey III, if they see their organi-
zation as a competitor with the Authority, 20% of CSOs’ representatives answered
positively whereas 69% declared that there is no competition whatsoever.
All in all, there are a number of accusations between the civil organizations
and the Authority’s institutions. These accusations range from allegations of the
Authority’s inefficiency and interference in the affairs of civil organizations, to ex-
changes over accusations of squandering money. Competition over donor monies
has been the source of some recent clashes (Hammami, 2000, pp. 17–20).
Turning to the question of the institutionalization of Palestinian civil society,
it emerges that it is highly institutionalized. Several indicators of this fact can
be illustrated. First, the number of CSOs in Palestine exceeds 1,200 (Hammami,
2000, p. 16), to which 12 universities, 4 university colleges, 12 vocational centers,
and over 100 newspapers and magazines should be added. This means that there
is around one CSO for approximately every 2,000 people. In comparison with the
Arab world, this average is close to the number found in Egypt which has developed
CSOs comparatively better than any other Arab country (Barghouti, 1998, p. 70).
Second, according to Survey II, the average number of founders of each
organization reached 12.7 and the average number of employees in each institution
reached 8.8. Third, though the responses of the surveyed organizations concerning
the number and size of their activities and the size of the participating public are
incredibly exaggerated,6 one can conclude that each organization holds at least
15 annual activities on average in which at least 100 people take part. This means
that, on an average, annually, each Palestinian adult participates in at least one
activity organized by a CSO.
Nonetheless, the success of any effort toward achieving change in the political
system in the direction of democracy depends on public concern in democratization
5Prior to the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, the PLO was supportive of the behavior
of various CSOs.6One institution for example, declared that 80,000 individuals participated in its activities in the space
of 1 year (1997).
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and the ability of CSOs to attract public involvement. And here, though in general,
one can certainly say that the Palestinians are concerned with the process of transi-
tion to democracy, it is not at all clear how democratization will be advanced if the
readiness amongst Palestinians to join and work in CSOs remains an inactivated
potential; according to Survey I the proportion of those who are committed to civil
organizations is 23% of the adult population.
Survey I found that individuals concerned with the transition to democracy
tend to come from middle-income and well-educated backgrounds, and are be-
tween the ages of 23 and 48, and are more likely to be men than women. Thus,
CSOs tend to attract people whose social backgrounds are closer to the political
elite than that of the general population. A brief glance at the political orientation
of the members of CSOs shows that they are generally supporters of the “nation-
alist” trend. The percentage of members of CSOs of this type is above the general
average, and they are below the general average within groups with an Islamic
orientation. Leftists have the highest rate of affiliation to CSOs (see Fig. 2). The
explanation behind this picture is that the left showed the greatest interest in the
new wave, after 1987, of establishing civil society institutions.
Futhermore, although there are positive signs of institutionalization, there are
problems with regard to sustainability. Sustainability is connected to two basic
factors in civil society’s functions—funding and voluntary work—and it seems
that Palestinian civil organizations suffer from a lack of both. According to Sur-
vey II, in the case of the ceasing of foreign funding, CSOs were expected to be
Fig. 2. CSO membership in relation to politi-
cal affiliation.
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able to continue their work for only 2 years on average, and 37% declared they
could continue for 1 year only. Universities and the media were not included in the
survey sample, but their financial situation is extremely bad—so much so that uni-
versities have recently resorted to requesting that they be placed as an item on the
National Authority’s budget. This has occurred as a result of the changing funding
priorities of the European Union which was the main supporter of universities in
the recent past.
In terms of voluntary work 84% of the CSOs sampled in Survey II declared
that they attempted to rally the voluntary support of the public, and 82% declared
that they were successful. In all cases, however, according to personal impressions
and calculations, voluntary work, in the best scenario, covers only 5% of the work
actually needed.
PALESTINIAN CSOs AND DEMOCRATIZATION
When it comes to CSOs’ concern with political issues, 50% of the represen-
tatives of CSOs believe that the role they play concerning the process of transition
to democracy within the country is considered of primary import, whereas 35%
consider this role secondary. As for the rest, they expressed the opinion that there
was originally no such role. Some 58% declared that they had activities directed
toward encouraging individuals to play a larger and more effective role in the
political life of the country.
Public confidence is necessary for the work of CSOs in the political arena.
Public confidence is also necessary to develop the habits of voluntary work which
constitutes a necessary condition for the civility of a society and a main mechanism
for advancing the transition to democracy (Rose, 1996, p. 251 ff).
The results of Survey I indicate that 23% of all adults are members of CSOs
and that 75% of them believe that there is a strong and active movement that
encourages democracy in the country. There is a degree of confidence in CSOs;
however, this confidence is not fully sufficient for the support of these institutions
in their direct effect upon the political system. This is because only 8% of the
public are convinced that CSOs are the appropriate framework through which to
influence the political system.
All in all, people do expect CSOs to play a role in democratization and the
existence of a degree of trust in these organizations to pursue this role cannot be
denied; there is public conviction that there is a need for rudimentary reforms, and
as Fig. 3 shows, respondents in Survey I place much higher importance on issues
of unemployment, the rule of law, and human rights than on the establishment of
opposition parties.
There are several factors that can help CSOs to gain people’s confidence
and advance the democratization of Palestinian society. These include building on
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the positive role played by academics in the political process during the Intifada
and the peace process in Madrid and Washington; a growing acceptance of civil
society as a body that is able to carry out political tasks of a general nature; and,
the confidence in the nationalist intentions of CSOs, despite the “western” foreign
funding they receive (Survey I found that 61.5% of CSOs believed that foreign
funding had a very positive effect, whereas 38.5% believed that the effect was
negative or very negative).
Against this, it is clear that foreign funding does prove constraining with
regard to the setting of a local agenda. The respondents in Survey I were asked
about their priorities concerning CSOs’ work. Upon evaluation of the answers,
a list of priorities appeared with health and child care services as top priorities,
followed by human and citizens’ rights, dissemination of awareness and civic
culture, media/journalism, agricultural services, scientific research, protection of
the environment, reform, women’s rights, and sports. By comparison, as Fig. 4
reveals (in which the respondents first priority was assigned an absolute value in
comparison to the other priorities), foreign donors to CSOs between the years 1995
and 1998 directed their activities primarily toward education, health, development,
and the issues of the retarded, women, and children (Hanafi, 1999). However, the
main problem resulting from the role of foreign funding does not lie in the fact
that donors’ priorities are contrary to those of the public as they perceive it, but
that donors’ priorities are not subjected to public consideration.
Fig. 4. Comparison between respondent priori-
ties and donation distribution.
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Central to the process of democratization is the promotion of civic culture;
the consolidation of a set of values that promote civility, deepen the feeling of
citizenship, promote egalitarian values and a sense of responsibility that stimulates
participation. In this respect, Palestinian CSOs spend a good deal of effort on
promoting civic culture though various activities such as awareness programs,
seminars, workshops, publications and dialogue with the Authority’s employees,
and advocacy. It is very hard to measure the impact of these activities, but there are
certain indirect indicators through which one might doubt the ability of CSOs to
produce measurable change in the feelings of Palestinians regarding their ability
to participate in political life. For example, opinion polls conducted by the Center
for Palestine Research and Studies have indicated that people do not feel that they
are able to criticize the Authority without fear. In three different polls carried out
in December 1996, September 1997, and March 1998 only between 35 and 37%
of respondents expressed a feeling of being able to criticize the Authority.
Together with governmental and foreign bodies, CSOs have made serious
efforts to enhance the rule of law. Over $100,000,000 was spent in this sector
in the period from August 1997 till February 1999 (Rule of Law Development
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1999, p. 11). Yet the public is not satisfied
with the judiciary. Upon asking the respondents in Survey I about their first and
second choice for the party from whom they would seek refuge in case they felt
persecuted, it became clear that the first priority amongst six choices was given to
the family or tribe (see Table I). Another tendency is people’s inclination to resort
to the executive authority more than the judiciary. Lawyers—who are the natural
party for those who want to revert to justice—are ranked very low in the table.
Although CSOs cannot be blamed for this situation—an indicator of their efforts is
that Human Rights organizations are well placed in Table I—it does demonstrate
a lack of some basic aspects of a civic culture. An indicator of their effort is that
civil society representatives (human rights institutions) are ranked third in Table I.
Another indicator of the existence of a civic culture is the degree of equality
between men and women. Here, Palestinian society does not fare well. It is evi-
dent from the results of Survey I that women’s issues lie near the bottom of the
scale of social priorities (see Fig. 3). Despite the efforts of CSOs in this area, the
Table I. People’s Choices Concerning the Parties They Resort to When Feeling Persecuted
Rank Party First choice (%) Second choice (%) Score
1. Family and tribe 38.1 17.4 31.2
2. Police 29.4 31.3 30.0
3. Human rights institutions 9.1 7.9 8.7
4. Influential acquaintances 7.5 10.5 8.5
No one 6.7 8.1 7.1
5. A lawyer 3.0 14.6 6.9
Others 3.4 5.0 3.9
6. Other security forces 2.7 5.2 3.5
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prevailing societal standpoint concerning women’s issues clearly limits tangible
change.
In sum, CSOs have much to work on in terms of promoting a civic culture in
Palestine. It must also be said that in terms of setting an example of democratic life,
Palestinian CSOs are not that successful. More than a quarter of CSOs declared that
they do not hold a conference to elect their leadership (Kassis et al., 1999b, p. 35).
And according to 21 CSO representatives who attended a Palestinian CSO network
meeting in June 1998 to discuss the relation between CSOs and society, the public is
alienated from CSOs’ decision-making procedures. CSO representatives explained
that one likely reason for this is that they receive high salaries in comparison with
the income levels within the country.
More positive is CSOs’ ability to play a role in democratization through
preparing present and future political leadership. There is no doubt that Palestinian
CSOs have succeeded in doing this to a great extent, and certainly at the level of
the Legislative Council (Hilal, 1997, pp. 120–123). And despite the shortcomings
with regard to internal democratic practice, CSOs are more democratic than are
tribal institutions and some institutions of the National Authority. For example,
the number of women amongst those employed in the post of director and above
in the ministries is 14%, at a time when the percentage of women who hold the
post of director and above in CSOs is 26% (Kassis et al., 1999a, p. 92).
An important platform for democrats, including those who represent civil
society, is the media. There are a number of newspapers and magazines in the
country; however, most are affiliated to the Authority and have been utilized by
the Authority as a major means for criticizing CSOs. There are also a number of
radio and television stations, but the right to broadcast at national level is held
by the television and radio corporation that is owned by the Authority. Although
there is no direct censorship, the National Authority has taken, since its initiation,
preemptory measures against newspapers, stations, and journalists, and this has
resulted in a high degree of “self censorship” amongst some journalists.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, CSOs in Palestine play a focal and positive, but limited role
in the process of democratization. CSOs have managed to develop, grow, and in-
stitutionalize in harsh political conditions. CSOs have contributed through their
high preoccupation with the nature of the political system and their direct interest
in democratization; they have been able to attract the main forces that stand tra-
ditionally behind democratization; and, they have successfully prepared political
leadership.
In other fields, CSOs’ work, despite their best efforts, does not seem to be
as successful. This applies to such areas as the promotion of civic values and the
competitive relationship of CSOs with the executive authority. In some cases the
P1: FEA/GFQ/GIR/GGN P2: LMD/GCR
Voluntas [voluntas] PP110-299859 April 4, 2001 12:47 Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
Palestinian CSOs and Democratization 47
shortcomings of CSOs can be related to the broader nature of Palestinian society,
such as the weak influence of women’s organizations. In other cases the lack of
a stable political system is a major factor constraining the impact of CSOs—
examples include the lack of a dependable judiciary and the lack of a free press.
It is also fair to say that CSOs have failed to mirror international civic norms
with regard to internal democracy, voluntarism, sustainability, responsiveness to
the public, and putting more effort into obtaining local funding so as to help make
them more accountable to their local constituencies (An-Na’im, 2000, p. 23).
Despite these limitations, in looking to the future, the important point to make
is that the activities of civil society organizations in Palestine are undoubtedly
contributing to the promotion of democratic principles of pluralism.
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